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THE FOOL ON THE HILL:
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS,
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION,
AND UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ
Philip P. Frickey"
During my childhood, say, roughly "[b]etween the end of the
Chatterley ban [a]nd the Beatles' first LP,"' a common response to
overreaction was "don't make a federal case out of it." I do not
believe that I have heard that expression since, well, Sgt. Pepper's
Lonely Hearts Club Band. That is not very surprising, because my
childhood began with the federal judicial call to arms in aid of
civil rights in Brown v. Board of Education2 and spanned the time
of the far more powerful and wide-ranging congressional responses
adopted in the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' the Voting Rights Act
of 1965,' the Fair Housing Act of 1968,. and ultimately the federalization of a matter once thought to be at the core of the local
police power, intrastate crime.6 Making a federal statutory case out
of it became an increasingly routine strategy for attacking social
ills. The Supreme Court customarily went along for the ride, often
* Faegre & Benson Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Jim Chen, Daniel
Farber, Barry Friedman, Gerald Gunther, Michael Paulsen, Suzanna Sherry, Don Welch,
and participants at a workshop at Vanderbilt University School of Law provided helpful
comments on a draft of this essay, and Michael Voves provided valuable research assistance.
1. PHILIP LARKIN, Annus Mirabilis, in COLtECTED POEMS 167, 167 (Anthony Thwaite
ed., 1988) (referring to the year 1963).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
2000a-2000h-6 (1988)).
4. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973-1973bb-1 (1988)).
5. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-901, 82 Stat. 73, 81-90 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1988)).
6. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, §§ 891-96, 82 Stat.
146, 159-62 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1988)) (outlawing loan
sharking).
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broadly construing the congressional enactment to promote its
mission.' Although the Court sometimes adopted a narrowing interpretation where a criminal statute arguably invading the local police power was ambiguous, 8 it never declared any congressional
initiative to be beyond the legislative power of Congress.
Yet also during my childhood, I came to understand that, "[a]s
every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of
dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government."9
I must have, anyway, because the Supreme Court has said so.'

7. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (holding that Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlaws facially neutral employment rules, even if
adopted and applied free from discriminatory intent, if they have significant discriminatory
impact); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969) (finding implied private right of action under the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Hamm v. City of Rock Hill,
379 U.S. 306, 312 (1964) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 abates pending state
criminal prosecutions of sit-in demonstrators); cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 413 (1968) (interpreting Reconstruction-era statute to reach racial discrimination in
the selling of a private home, which arguably provided a remedy even broader than the
newly adopted Fair Housing Act of 1968).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 400 (1973) (holding that the
Hobbs Act prohibition on extortion does not reach the use of violence in labor disputes
to obtain legitimate union objectives); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-50 (1971)
(construing federal prohibition on gun possession by felon to include element of connection to interstate commerce); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811-12 (1971) (holding that the Travel Act does not reach operation of an illegal gambling operation frequented by out-of-state clientele).
9. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
10. As a complete aside, it might be noted that the Court's judicial notice of conventional childhood learning has not been free from controversy. The quotation from Gregory
has unfortunate parallels to Justice Reed's infamous dictum that "[elvery American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges
by force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for
blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that deprived them
of their land." Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955). Justice
Reed's statement was an apparent jab at the great Indian law scholar, Felix Cohen, who
earlier had challenged what "[e]very American schoolboy is taught to believe" about the
transfer of Indian lands to the descendants of Europeans. See Felix S. Cohen, Original
Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28, 34-47 (1947). Although the Court's other uses of this
adage seem less offensive, they often represent dubious assertions about what children,
and the rest of us, supposedly know. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427
U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand
why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same."); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 439 (1974) ("virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the concept" of the
constitutional ban on compelled self-incrimination); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
740 n.16 (1972) ("[elvery schoolboy may be familiar" with a "famous observation" by de
Tocqueville); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 145 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("as every schoolboy knows, the Framers 'designed' the Bill of Rights not
against 'state power,' but against the power of the Federal Government"). It is probably
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To be sure, I do not recall experiencing any cognitive dissonance
at the conflict between principles of constitutional federalism and
the ever-expanding congressional role. As Saint Paul suggested,
however, as an adult I must relinquish such childish ways," especially because, in the view of the Supreme Court, "[iln the tension
between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty."'2
Whether or not that tension actually produces liberty, it does
foster constitutional litigation. The most recent case, United States
v. Lopez, 3 in which the Court struck down federal legislation as
beyond Congress's commerce power for the first time since the
New Deal, writes a new chapter on what the Court has called the
"oldest question of constitutional law."' 4 In this essay, I address

one of the many questions left hanging by Lopez: what role do
congressional processes and findings play in assessing the constitutionality of federal legislation adopted pursuant to the commerce
power? I first provide an overview of the ways in which the Supreme Court has treated congressional findings, including the Lopez
case. I then assess the potential utility of legislative processes and
findings more broadly, examining possible analogies to precedents
outside the Commerce Clause arena. My conclusion is that the approach taken in Lopez may be a plausible technique to encourage
appropriate congressional procedures and consideration, but in
principle cannot be cabined short of having applications outside the

past time to give this adage a rest.
11. 1 Corinthians 13:11.
12. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459. As this quotation demonstrates, Gregory, an opinion by
Justice O'Connor, like Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992), which Justice O'Connor jointly authored, embodies the justificatory jurisprudential
technique of reasoning by aphorism. See, e.g., id. at 844 ("Liberty finds no refuge in a
jurisprudence of doubt"); id. at 851 ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life."). Perhaps some future case can be encapsulated in "freedom's just another word for
nothin' left to lose." KRiSTOPHER KRISTOFFERSON, Me and Bobby McGee on MB AND
BOBBY McGEE (Columbia 1971).
To be sure, as Justice O'Connor has also written, "[s]ome truths are so basic that,
like the air around us, they are easily overlooked." New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 187 (1992). Nonetheless, a basic problem with this technique is, of course, that
aphorisms have more pith than pull. That is an essential point, I take it, of my colleague
Mike Paulsen's imaginative reimaging of Brown through the lens of Casey in a way that
would have reaffirmed Plessy. See Michael S. Paulsen & Daniel N. Rosen, Brown, CaseyStyle: The Shocking First Draft of the Segregation Opinions, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1287
(1994). The first sentence of the "draft opinion" is "[w]here there is doubt, there is no
law." Id. at 1288.
13. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
14. New York, 505 U.S. at 149.
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review of commerce-power exercises. Whether the Court will prove
willing to apply somewhat more searching review of legislative
processes and outcomes in noneconomic cases that, unlike Lopez,
involve personal equality rather than the structures of federalism
will determine, I suggest, whether Lopez can be defended as a
principled decision promoting legislative attention to important but
often undervalued constitutional interests.
I.
In September 1935, during the dark days of the Great Depression across the land and of the constitutional depression across the
Roosevelt Administration, a government attorney three days short
of his twenty-fifth birthday completed a memorandum. It considered whether the congressional findings adopted in the newly enacted National Labor Relations Act'5 demonstrated that the statute
was within the legislative power of Congress pursuant to its authority to regulate commerce among the states. According to these
findings, the denial of collective bargaining rights to workers led to
strikes and other forms of labor unrest that, in turn, burdened interstate commerce in a variety of ways.' 6 In his memorandum, the
youthful attorney concluded that, based on precedent, the Supreme
Court should defer to the congressional findings unless they were
not fairly debatable. 7 Consistent with the legal realism of his
times, however, he quickly conceded that the difficulty with his
analysis "is that it is too mechanical and does not make allowance
for judicial bias."'" The attorney continued:
A more realistic approach might result in the empty conclusion that if the [Supreme] Court decides to sustain the
National Labor Relations Act its opinion will be written in
the language used above. The ultimate answer to the real
question-the weight to be given to the legislative determination in the Court's consideration of the validity of the
statute as distinct from the weight given it in its phrasing

15. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-168 (1988)).
16. See Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449-50 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §
151).
17. See Stanley S. Surrey, The Relevance and Importance of the Congressional Findings Contained in the National Labor Relations Act 21-22 (Sept. 30, 1935) (unpublished
manuscript, copy on file with the author).
18. Id. at 22.
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in the written decision-depends upon speculation as to
how radical a departure from existing constitutional theory
and generally accepted forms of legislative control the
Court deems the National Labor Relations Act to be.19
The attorney was Stanley Surrey,' who in relatively short
order had the good sense to forsake constitutional law in favor of
federal taxation, a subject in which he became a leading figure of
this century." The National Labor Relations Act also weathered the
later years quite well, its constitutionality being upheld two years
later in the landmark decision of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.' Although Jones & Laughlin and the watershed opinion
that followed, United States v. Darby,' which upheld the Fair

Labor Standards Act of 1938,24 did not simply defer to congressional findings in upholding federal legislation regulating commercial intrastate conduct, in each case the Court seemed satisfied that
Congress had developed adequate factual support for the linkage
between the statutory scheme and interstate commerce.'
In short order, the judicial abandonment of strict review of
legislation adopted under the Commerce Clause became so apparent
that it would have been a waste of public resources to assign a
latter-day government attorney a task similar to Surrey's. Congressional power under the Commerce Clause justifies federal regula19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Although Surrey served well in support of New Deal regulatory activities, by the
time of his death his reputation was firmly linked to the field of taxation. See PEMR H.
IRONS, THE NEw DEAL LAwYERs 255 (1982). None of the Harvard Law Review essays
and other materials memorializing Surrey's life in the law, see 98 HARV. L. REv. 329-50
(1984), took note of his service at the NLRB beyond William Andrews' acknowledgment
that only "[a]fter a few years of other pursuits" did Surrey begin working for the Treasury Department. William D. Andrews, A Source of Inspiration, 98 HARv. L. REV. 332,
332 (1984). Surrey's closest scholarly encounter with issues related to those evaluated in
his memorandum apparently was in the excellent legislation casebook he co-authored. See
FRANK C. NEwMAN & STANLEY S. SURREY, LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS

(1955).
22. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
23. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
24. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-212 (1988)).
25. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 123; Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 43. Prior to Jones &
Laughlin, Charles Fahy, General Counsel of the NLRB, thought that the careful drafting
of and congressional findings in the National Labor Relations Act would cause Chief
Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts to vote to uphold the statute despite their pivotal
votes to strike down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, which established
labor rules for coal mining, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). See
IRONS, supra note 21, at 252-53.
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tion of one farmer feeding his own crops to his own animals,' of
hotels and even locally oriented eateries that racially discriminate
in their clienteles,27 of intrastate activities that harm the environment, such as strip mining,' and of intrastate criminal activity of
an economic nature, such as loan sharking.29 Indeed, it would appear that Congress had authority indistinguishable from the local
police power over any local activity that could, through the application of a lively imagination, be indirectly linked to interstate
commercial concerns. These developments were increasingly supported by reference to congressional findings."
This progression was not without its critics, however, and some
of the controversy concerned the role of congressional findings.
Most notably, in Perez v. United States,3 the case upholding the
federal loan sharking statute as applied to local unlawful lending,
the Court heavily relied upon congressional findings and legislative
history concluding that loan sharking was linked to interstate organized crime.32 Indeed, the Court never itself embraced the proposition that extortionate credit transactions affected interstate commerce. Instead, the Court stressed that "[e]xtortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress
affect interstate commerce,"33 and that "[t]he findings of Congress
are quite adequate on that ground."34 Although it hastened to add
that Congress need not "make particularized findings in order to
legislate,"35 the Court left itself open to the interpretation that

26. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
27. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
28. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
29. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
30. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 5-5 (2d ed. 1988). Tribe
pointed out that
[i]n
recent years, Congress has relied in part upon the "cumulative effect" principle as its constitutional justification for civil rights legislation, certain criminal
statutes, regulatory measures affecting the sale of foods and additives, and a
registration law for drug producers. In each case, congressional fact-findings
stressed that the regulation of local incidents of an activity was necessary to
abate a cumulative evil affecting national commerce. The Supreme Court has
without fail given effect to such congressional findings.
31. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
32. See id. at 147, 154-57.
33. Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 155. In its concluding paragraph, the Court said that "[it appears" that loan
sharking was linked to organized interstate crime. Id. at 157.
35. Id. at 156.
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Congress can reach practically anything under its Commerce Clause
power so long as detailed findings are adopted. Justice Stewart
dissented from this view, demanding a showing that "loan sharking
is an activity with interstate attributes that distinguish it in some
substantial respect from other local crime."36 A decade later, while
concurring specially in upholding the federal strip-mining statute,

Justice Rehnquist argued that, "simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so. Congress's findings must be
supported by a 'rational basis' and are reviewable by the
courts.

37

Notwithstanding these rather isolated complaints, however, by
the 1980s, the Commerce Clause game seemed about over.38
Casebook editors were driven to dream up wild hypotheticals to try
to find ways to encourage students to consider whether the commerce power had any practical limits at all.39 The hypotheticals

were, however, not much more implausible than actual lower-court
cases upholding the expansive application of federal legislation.
The lower courts had applied federal criminal statutes containing a
requirement of a nexus with interstate commerce in remarkably
expansive ways. For example, a federal statute outlawing arson of
a building used in an activity that affects commerce 4 reaches the
burning of a private home that received natural gas that had traveled in interstate commerce' or electricity from an interstate
36. Id at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
37. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
38. See TRIBE, supra note 30, § 5-5, at 310 n.6 ('Exactly what significance Chief Justice Rehnquist's more restrictive view of the commerce clause [expressed in his separate
opinion in Hodel] would have in application is unclear, in any event, none of his fellow
Justices have shown any inclination to plow with him territory that the Court tilled so
fruitlessly from 1887 to 1937.").
39. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER Er AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTTUONAL
LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTrrION's Ti-RD CENTURY 789, 813, 817 (1993) (questioning whether congressional power could reach a child's front-yard entrepreneurial venture,
Leslie's Lemonade Stand); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 140 (12th ed. 1991)
(contemplating federal prohibition on possession of all pills because it is difficult to distinguish dangerous pills from others); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
197, 209 (2d ed. 1991) (suggesting federal prohibition of shoplifting and federal regulation
of the lawn, parking lot, and disposal of trash at carry-out restaurant); cf. Brief for National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as amicus curiae, at 20 n.11, Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260) (containing suggestion by Barry Friedman, a prominent
scholar of federalism, that Congress could prohibit daydreaming because it "reduces economic productivity and thus has a substantial effect on interstate commerce").
40. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994).
41. See United States v. Stillwell, 900 F.2d 1104, 1106-10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498
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grid.42 Federal criminal statutes embodying no requirement of a
nexus with interstate commerce have sometimes been given essentially universal application, often based on thin congressional findings,43 at least so long as it is clear that Congress did not intend
a limiting nexus requirement.'
Into this valley of deference rode a few federal lower court
judges in the 1990s. A federal district judge surely stunned most
observers by striking down the federal "carjacking" statute,45
which prohibits the use of a firearm, "with the intent to cause
death or serious bodily harm," in stealing "from the presence of
another" a car "that has been transported, shipped or received in
interstate" commerce.' Although the decision was ultimately reversed,47 the carjacking case was a signal that at least some low-

U.S. 838 (1990). But see United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 525-28 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding, after Lopez, that the arson statute does not reach a private residence that
uses interstate natural gas).
42. See United States v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1838 (1995).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 459 F.2d 949, 951-53 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 878 (1972) (upholding a federal prohibition of intrastate drug trafficking based
on congressional findings that it was necessary to regulate interstate trafficking and that
intrastate trafficking had a substantial and direct effect on interstate commerce); United
States v. Lopez, 461 F.2d 499, 500 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (upholding a federal
prohibition of simple narcotics possession on similar rationale); Stevens v. United States,
440 F.2d 144, 151 (6th Cir. 1971) (upholding conviction under federal statute that court
construed as prohibiting possession by convicted felon of any firearm, regardless of any
nexus to commerce, where the relevant finding in the statute was a bare conclusion that
possession of weapons by convicted felons is "a burden on commerce or threat affecting
the free flow of commerce"); see also United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1520 (10th
Cir. 1995) (upholding federal prohibition of possession and transfer of machine guns even
though commerce nexus was not an element of the offense and little in the way of congressional findings was made).
44. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349-50 (1971) (holding that where federal statute invades traditional area of local criminal jurisdiction, requirement of a showing
of interstate nexus will be presumed to be element of crime unless statutory text and
legislative history clearly demonstrate the contrary). Bass applied this canon to the statute
at issue in Stevens and imposed a commerce-nexus requirement. Bass, 404 U.S. at 350.
The nexus requirement remains easy to satisfy, though. See, e.g., Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977) (showing that a gun had previously traveled in interstate
commerce was sufficient to satisfy nexus between commerce and felon's possession of
firearm).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).
46. See United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 244 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (invalidating the statute as "lacking any rational nexus to interstate commerce"), rev'd sub nom.
United States v. Osteen, 30 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1825
(1995).
47. The reversal was based on United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106 (6th Cir. 1994),
which upheld the constitutionality of the carjacking statute. See United States v. Osteen,
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er-court judges were frustrated with the gymnastics required to sustain, under the Commerce Clause, some applications of federal
criminal law to intrastate crime.
Much more successful, of course, was the Fifth Circuit's coun48
terattack on the commerce power in United States v. Lopez,
which was eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court. The federal
statute at issue in Lopez, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990, 49 criminalized possession of a gun near a school. The statute contained no commerce-nexus element, nor was it supported by
formal congressional findings or much legislative history that might
serve as evidence of informal findings. In assessing its constitutionality, the Fifth Circuit made much of the role of formal or informal congressional findings in supporting exercises of the commerce
power. It concluded that "[w]here Congress has made findings,
formal or informal, that regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, the courts must defer 'if there is any rational basis
for' the finding. Practically speaking, such findings almost always
end the matter."5' The Fifth Circuit saw Congress as having the
primary responsibility for assessing the boundary of the commerce
power, but noted that "[clourts cannot properly perform their duty
to determine if there is any rational basis for a Congressional finding if neither the legislative history nor the statute itself reveals
any such relevant finding."' Furthermore, "in such a situation
there is nothing to indicate that Congress itself consciously fixed,
as opposed to simply disregarded, the boundary line between the
commerce power and the reserved powers of the states. Indeed, as
in this case, there is no substantial indication that the commerce
power was even invoked." '
The Fifth Circuit concluded that congressional findings would

No. 93-6398, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *4-5 (6th Cir. July 26, 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1825 (1995). Other circuits have recently upheld the statute. See United States v.
Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 575-90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995); United States
v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 549-50 (9th Cir. 1995). But the support for constitutionality is not
unanimous. See Bishop, 66 F.3d at 590-603 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing that the statute is unconstitutional in light of United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)).
48. 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).

49. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)-(4) (1994).
50. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1363 (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 304). The
court stated that it knew "of no Supreme Court decision in the last half century that has
set aside such a finding as without rational basis.' Id. at 1363 n.43.
51. Id. at 1363-64.
52. Id. at 1364.
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have been particularly useful because the federal statute at issue
invaded not just the local police power in general, but management
of a traditional state function, public education, in particular.53 The
statute also could not be justified as supported by formal or informal findings made by earlier Congresses in related legislation, for
never before had Congress enacted an analogous statute. 4 The
court contrasted its precedents upholding federal criminalization of
the possession of narcotics 5 and enhancing the punishment for
drug offenses near schools 6 on the ground that "all drug trafficking had been held properly subject to federal regulation on the
basis of detailed Congressional57 findings that such was necessary to
regulate interstate trafficking.
Following the grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court in
Lopez, 8 but prior to oral argument, Congress attempted to respond
to the Fifth Circuit's concerns about the absence of findings. Inserted into the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 9 was a provision amending the Gun-Free School Zones Act
to include congressional findings about the effects on interstate
commerce of gun possession in schools.' Ultimately, however, the

53. Id.
54. Id. at 1366.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1366 n.50.
57. Id.
58. 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).
59. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
2 U.S.C., 8 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 21
U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.)
60. The amendment provided as follows:
The Congress finds and declares that(A) crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a pervasive, nationwide problem;
(B) crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate movement of drugs,
guns, and criminal gangs;
(C) firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and have been
found in increasing numbers in and around schools, as documented in numerous
hearings in both the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives and
Judiciary Committee of the Senate;
(D) in fact, even before the sale of a firearm, the gun, its component parts,
ammunition, and the raw materials from which they are made have considerably
moved in interstate commerce;
(E)while criminals freely move from State to State, ordinary citizens and foreign visitors may fear to travel to or through certain parts of the country due
to concern about violent crime and gun violence, and parents may decline to
send their children to school for the same reason;
(F) the occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in a decline in
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congressional rescue effort failed. The Solicitor General did not
contend that these later findings could operate nunc pro tunc, instead making the more defensible argument that the post hoc findings simply added evidence to support the rational basis for a
nexus with commerce. 6'
Like the Fifth Circuit, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Lopez struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Although the respondent's brief had urged the Court to take that step
because of the absence of congressional findings, 62 the Court's
major doctrinal basis for its holding had little to do with the presence or absence of findings. Instead, the essential analytical move
was the holding that federal regulation adopted under the Commerce Clause may reach only those wholly intrastate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.63 Like the Fifth Circuit,
the Supreme Court found insufficient linkage between gun possession near schools and interstate commerce. The Court concluded
that accepting the government's arguments in defense of the statute-that gun possession near schools may result in violent crime,
which in turn affects the national economy by causing economic
losses spread across society through the vehicle of insurance and
by reducing travel to areas where violence is prevalent M-- would
essentially empower Congress to regulate "any activity that it found

the quality of education in our country;
(G) this decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact on interstate
commerce and the foreign commerce of the United States;
(H) States, localities, and school systems find it almost impossible to handle
gun-related crime by themselves; even States, localities, and school systems that
have made strong efforts to prevent, detect, and punish gun-related crime find
their efforts unavailing due in part to the failure or inability of other States or
localities to take strong measures; and
(I)Congress has power, under the interstate commerce clause and other provisions of the Constitution, to enact measures to ensure the integrity and safety
of the Nation's schools by enactment of this subsection.
Pub. L. 103-322, § 320,904, 108 Stat. at 2125-26 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)
(1994)).
61. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 n.4 (1995) (discussing page 25
of transcript of oral argument). The Government's supplemental brief simply called these
findings to the attention of the Court and conceded that the later legislation did "not
resolve the conflict in the courts of appeals regarding the validity of prosecutions under
the [pre-]existing statute." See Supplemental Brief for the United States at 2, Lopez, (No.
93-1260) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6 n.4, Lopez (No. 93-1260)).
62. See Brief for Respondent at 19, 36-37, Lopez, (No. 93-1260) (arguing the need for
findings in this case).
63. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
64. See id. at 1632.
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was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens." 5
According Congress this power, the Court believed, would destroy
any meaningful distinction between the local police power and the
enumerated authority of Congress, "even in areas such as criminal
law enforcement or education where States historically have been
sovereign." For similar "slippery slope" reasons, the Court rejected Justice Breyer's argument, in dissent, that congressional power
was justified because violence in schools degrades the educational
process,
which in turn has adverse consequences upon the econo67
my.
The Court in Lopez repeatedly stressed that the gun statute was
a regulation that was noneconomic in character.6 8 In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, both of
whose votes were crucial to constituting the majority, even more
clearly indicated that the noneconomic nature of the regulation was
crucial to the Court's rigorous inquiry about effects on interstate
commerce. 69 In this way, the Court seemed to distinguish all earlier cases, in which commercial transactions were the justifications
for the exercise of the commerce power. In essence, Lopez held
that a regulation that is noneconomic in character may be justified,
under the Commerce Clause, only when its subject matter has a
significant linkage to commercial transactions of an interstate magnitude, especially if it invades a core state function such as public
education.
Unlike the Fifth Circuit below, the Supreme Court deemphasized the importance of the absence of congressional findings. The
Court's only discussion of the issue was as follows:
Although as part of our independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course consider
legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings, regarding effect on interstate commerce, the

65. Id.
66. Id.; see also id. at 1632-34.
67. See id. at 1632-34 (rejecting dissenting opinion of Breyer, J., joined by Stevens,
Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.).
68. See 115 S. Ct. at 1626, 1630-34.
69. See id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
"Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single
market and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy"); id. at 1640 (recognizing that "unlike the earlier cases to come before the Court here neither the actors nor
their conduct have a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the
statute have an evident commercial nexus").
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Government concedes that "[n]either the statute nor its
legislative history contain[s] express congressional findings
regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun
possession in a school zone." We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity
has on interstate commerce. But to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected
interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect
was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.7 °
The Court thus appeared to approach the role of formal congressional findings quite differently than the Fifth Circuit. The appeals
court viewed the absence of formal findings to be a narrow, procedural ground upon which to invalidate the statute, while the Supreme Court considered the lack of findings simply to negate one
source of potential support for the proposition that the statute had a
rational connection to interstate commerce.
Nonetheless, as Justice Souter noted in his dissent, the Court
did not clearly repudiate the proposition that formal findings might
have tipped the scales in the case.7 It also remains true, as the
Fifth Circuit had stressed, that before Lopez, the presence of formal
findings might have seemed, as a practical matter, to ensure validity of the statute in question.' Therefore, although Lopez provides
no authoritative answer to the future utility of congressional findings, the decision provides the occasion for a consideration of that
question. Assessing this problem requires returning to the pre-New
Deal era in which congressional power to regulate intrastate activities under the Commerce Clause was the exception, not the rule.
Indeed, Lopez itself, by being the first case to invalidate Commerce
Clause legislation in over half a century, clearly indicates that, to
understand the sudden disarray on the current scene, one must go
back to what just might be the future.

70. Id- at 1631-32 (quoting Brief for United States at 5-6). Like the Fifth Circuit, see
supra text accompanying note 54, the Supreme Court also concluded that the government
could not rely upon any knowledge accumulated by Congress through previous enactments
because the Gun-Free School Zones Act was not analogous to any prior legislation. Id. at
1632.
71. Id. at 1655 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72. See supra text accompanying note 50.
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I.
Prior to the watershed decisions in Jones & Laughlin, Darby,
and Filburn, the Court had sent some signals about the utility of
congressional findings that a statutory initiative had a sufficient
nexus to interstate commerce. Probably the most revealing precedent upholding doubtful federal legislation containing formal findings was Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen,3 involving the
congressional power to regulate futures sales of grain. Congress
first indirectly attempted to put such regulation in place through
The Future Trading Act,74 which prohibitively taxed such sales
unless the boards of trade in question complied with congressional
regulations. The Court struck down that approach in Hill v.
Wallace,75 largely on the ground that it was a sham exercise in
which the tax power was used for regulatory purposes.76 The
Court in Hill, however, also opined that
sales for future delivery on the Board of Trade are not in
and of themselves interstate commerce. They cannot come
within the regulatory power of Congress as such, unless
they are regarded by Congress, from the evidence before it,
as directly interfering with interstate commerce so as to be
an obstruction or a burden thereon. 7
Congress immediately responded to Hill by passing the Grain Futures Act,7" which contained express, detailed, and persuasive findings concerning the relationship between grain futures transactions
and interstate commerce.79 In upholding the new statute in Olsen,

73. 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
74. Ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921).
75. 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
76. The Court relied, see id. at 67-68, upon its famous decision in a companion case
to Hill, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), the child labor tax case.
77. 259 U.S. at 69.
78. Ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (regulating transactions on grain futures exchanges).
79. Id. at 999. Section 3 of the Act, 42 Stat. 999, provided as follows:
Transactions in grain involving the sale thereof for future delivery as
commonly conducted on boards of trade and known as "futures" are affected
with a national public interest; that such transactions are caried on in large
volume by the public generally and by persons engaged in the business of
buying and selling grain and the products and by-products thereof in interstate
commerce; that the prices involved in such transactions are generally quoted
and disseminated throughout the United States and in foreign countries as a
basis for determining the prices to the producer and the consumer of grain and
the products and by-products thereof and to facilitate the movements thereof in
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the Court emphasized that these findings were directly aimed at the
Court's concerns in Hill"0 and had been "reached after many years
of investigation and examination of witnesses, including the advocates of regulation and those opposed, and men intimately advised
in respect to the grain markets of the country."8 These favorable
-procedural aspects, when combined with the Court's conclusion that
Congress's findings were not unreasonable in light of the evidence
amassed in support of them, led the Court to uphold the statute.82
In contrast to Olsen, the Court gave short shrift to congressional findings in several other cases. Perhaps the best example is
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,83 in which the Court struck down the

Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 19354 as beyond the commerce power. The statute, which regulated wages, work hours and
conditions, and collective bargaining in the coal industry, contained
congressional findings that lacked specificity. The findings basically
asserted that the coal industry affected the national public interest,
that regulation of the industry was required, and that the production
and distribution of coal affected interstate commerce. In striking
down the statute as beyond the commerce power, the Court essen-

interstate commerce; that such transactions are utilized by shippers, dealers,
millers, and others engaged in handling grain and the products and by-products
thereof in interstate commerce as a means of hedging themselves against possible loss through fluctuations in price; that the transactions and prices of grain
on such boards of trade are susceptible to speculation, manipulation, and control, and sudden or unreasonable fluctuations in the prices thereof frequently
occur as a result of such speculation, manipulation, or control, which are detrimental to the producer or the consumer and the persons handling grain and
products and by-products thereof in interstate commerce, and that such fluctuations in prices are an obstruction to and a burden upon interstate commerce in
grain and the products and by-products thereof and render regulation imperative
for the protection of such commerce and the national public interest therein.
Id at 999.
80. See Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 32 (1923) (noting differences
between the statute struck down in Hill and the newer statute).
81. Id. at 10; see also id. at 10-15 (reviewing the evidence on these matters gathered
by Senate and House committees as well as by the Federal Trade Commission).
82. See id. at 37-38 (emphasizing that Congress had "expressly declared" certain transactions to affect interstate commerce in particular ways, that the findings were supported
by evidence before the Congress, and that therefore "we would be unwarranted in rejecting the finding of Congress as unreasonable"). For other cases before Jones & Laughlin
deferring to congressional findings, see Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240,
311-16 (1935), and Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 521 (1922).
83. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
84. Ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991 (1935) (providing for federal regulation of the bituminous
coal industry).
85. Ch. 824, § 1, 49 Stat. 991, 991-92 (1935).
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tially lectured the Congress that it lacked any plenary power to
legislate in the national interest. The Court stated that the findings
"[did] not constitute an exertion of the will of Congress which is
legislation, but a recital of considerations which in the opinion of
that body existed and justified the expression of its will in the
present act." 6 "Whether the end sought to be attained by an act
of Congress is legitimate is wholly a matter of constitutional power," the Court rather impatiently explained, "and not at all of legis'
lative discretion."87
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States8 delivered,
albeit indirectly, a similar message about general, unfocused congressional findings. The National Industrial Recovery Ac 9 at issue in that case contained a finding merely asserting that an economic emergency existed that burdened interstate commerce.' ° In
striking down the regulation as beyond the commerce power, the
Court did not even bother to trouble itself with these findings.9
These cases suggest that the Court would not wholly defer to
congressional findings, which is wholly unsurprising considering
the independent judicial duty to assess constitutionality. Surrey
understood the law to be to that effect in September 1935.' So
too did a leading academic commentator writing a decade before.93 When the findings are detailed rather than boilerplate and
86. Carter, 298 U.S. at 290 (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 291.
88. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down provisions of the Live Poultry Code of Fair
Competition of Metropolitan New York Area, promulgated under the National Industrial
Recovery Act).
89. Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
90. Ch. 90, § I, 48 Stat. at 195.
91. The Court did allude to the generality of these findings in its discussion of the
delegation of legislative power found in the Act. See Carter, 295 U.S. at 531, 534-35,
537-42.
92. See Surrey, supra note 17, at 20-21. Surrey stated that
[i]t seems clear that such findings will not be regarded by the Court as finally
and conclusively determining the factual questions involved. Such acceptance
would practically force the Court to hold the National Labor Relations Act and
other similar statutes valid under the commerce clause without further discussion, for if the unfair labor practices of employers do in fact obstruct and
burden interstate commerce they can be controlled by Congress. As the Court
is not disposed to deprive itself of its power of judicial control in such cases,
it will not accept the legislative findings as determinative of the factual questions.
93. See Henry Bikl, Judicial Determinations of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REv. 6, 19 (1924) ("It is clear that
the legislative finding as to the fact upon which the validity of the legislation depends
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are responsive to judicial concerns, however, it only stands to
reason that they ought to carry some weight in the judicial assessment. Olsen speaks to the validity of this rather obvious conclusion.
The key element in the analysis, which thus far has received
short shrift, is just how the factual findings of Congress can be
responsive to judicial concerns. The most elaborate and persuasive
demonstration of social facts cannot overcome a clear judicial
limitation upon legislative power. either the court must strike down
the well-intended but ultra vires legislation, or it must modify the
constitutional standard for assessing the legislation as a way to
uphold it. To be sure, this is not an hermetically sealed process.
The legislative factual demonstration may persuade the judges of
the legitimacy of a factual conclusion that at first blush seemed
implausible. Olsen seems to have been an example of that phenomenon. The larger lesson of the New Deal Supreme Court, though,
is that a thorough, sustained effort of factual reeducation-for
example, about the nationwide interrelation of the American economy and the "felt necessities"94 of federal regulation of it-may, in
time, reorient the thinking of the judiciary sufficient to work an
evolution in constitutional law. That, coupled with other, less debatable facts of life-that Justices grow old and leave the Court, to
be replaced by those more attuned to the sentiments of the current
political majority-is what the "switch in time" was all about.
Jones & Laughlin was not the result of judicial deference to
congressional factual conclusions per se nearly so much as it was
evidence of constitutional (that is, judicial) evolution in the face of
a sustained and increasingly thoughtful congressional showing that
its power to regulate "commerce among the states" must, in light
of the demonstrably integrated national economy, include the authority to regulate labor-management relations. Eventually, after
96
Darby95 and Wickard v. Filburn,
the case upholding regulation
of a farmer's production of crops to feed to his own animals, it
became clear that the economic reeducation of the Court had become complete, and that the judicial acceptance of the notion of an

cannot be allowed to be binding upon the courts, since this would furnish a simple means
of preventing judicial review of such legislation in this class of cases.").
94. This usage is, of course, Holmes'. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
95. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
96. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:695

integrated national economy accorded Congress the authority to
engage in economic regulation essentially across the board. Again,
a proceduralist focus on formal congressional processes and factfinding did not mechanically produce these results. Indeed, Darby
made clear that the absence of congressional findings was no fatal
legislative flaw. 97 Seven years later, the Court made it even clearer that Congress not only need not have made formal legislative
findings to support its exercise of the commerce power, it need not
even recite that this power had been invoked. 98
These precedents from the New Deal and shortly thereafter
make much of the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Lopez seem
incongruous. Recall that the appellate court stressed that Congress
not only had made no formal findings that the possession of guns
near schools affected commerce, it had not even made clear that it
was invoking its commerce power in the first place. Based on
these precedents, one is entitled to respond, "so what?"
The Fifth Circuit's approach receives little support from the
post-New Deal era, either. The cases upholding the constitutionality
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 indicated that Congress no longer
even needed an economic motivation to exercise its commerce
power.I" ° Formal congressional fact-finding had essentially nothing to do with these cases. Indeed, the congressional factual premises for this legislation were never formally inscribed in the
statute. It was enough for the Court that the premises were explicitly articulated in a legislative history documenting their factual
plausibility.'
Where, then, could the Fifth Circuit have found the idea that
the absence of formal findings could be fatal to legislation adopted

97. The Court in Darby recognized that
Congress has sometimes left it to the courts to determine whether the intrastate
activities have the prohibited effect on the commerce . . . . It has sometimes
left it to an administrative board or agency to determine whether the activities
sought to be regulated or prohibited have such effect . . . . And sometimes
Congress itself has said that a particular activity affects the commerce ....
312 U.S. at 120.
98. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) ("Mhe constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it
undertakes to exercise.").
99. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
100. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964).
101. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964) (stating that "no formal
findings were made, which of course are not necessary"); id. at 299-300 (investigating the
legislative history and finding sufficient support for the exercise of the commerce power).
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pursuant to the Commerce Clause? In one sense, the appellate
court created the notion out of thin air. There simply is no Supreme Court decision, before or after Jones & Laughlin, suggesting
such a requirement. The most that can be said for the Fifth
Circuit's approach, as a matter of precedent, is that the Supreme
Court in Perez signaled that the presence of formal congressional
findings should lead to extraordinary judicial deference in assessing
the constitutionality of legislation."re On its face, of course, Perez
says nothing about the judicial inquiry in the absence of findings.
Perez does suggest, however, that procedural regularity and
formal findings have some role to play in assessing the efficacy of
an exercise of congressional commerce power. I want to explore
three possibilities in this regard: the relation between congressional
fact-finding and congressional authority; the relation between congressional process and judicial statutory-interpretation techniques
rooted in constitutional values; and the relation between congressional process and judicial constitutional scrutiny.
The first concerns the special way findings of fact influence
constitutional law. Much constitutional law is based on factual
premises. Whether there is a nexus with commerce, whether discrimination has occurred, and whether state regulation burdens
interstate commerce are just three examples in which "legislative
facts"' 0 3-the facts that provide the premise for a rule of
law--can be contentious and must be evaluated. Three decades
ago, Archibald Cox proposed that, because Congress has greater
fact-finding ability than the federal courts, its judgment on such
questions should not be judicially second-guessed."° Cox was
writing in the aftermath of Katzenbach v. Morgan," which seemingly held that Congress had the authority to expand (but not to
contract) the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment." In light

102. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
103. On legislative facts in the constitutional setting, see, for example, Kenneth L.
Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 75. The term
"legislative facts" originated in Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REv. 364 (1942).
104. See Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 104-05 (1966)
[hereinafter Cox, Constitutional Adjudication]. For a later discussion, see Archibald Cox,
The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199 (1971).
105. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
106. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Morgan was not crystal-clear, but it
suggested that Congress had authority to outlaw state practices if, in Congress's judgment,
they were violations of equal protection, even if the Court would disagree. See 384 U.S.
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7 that "it is emof the famous statement in Marbury v. Madison"0
phatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is,""' any complete judicial deference to congressional constitutional interpretation would seem insupportable."°
Cox attempted to explain the purported "Morgan power" not as a
power to revise our fundamental law, but instead as authority to
make definitive factual conclusions."'
If Cox was correct, then the presence of factual findings in a
case like Perez should result in complete judicial deference. The
courts must accept Congress's judgment about a nexus with interstate commerce as the last word. This approach, however, has not
withstood the test of time. The Court has not adopted this understanding of Morgan when it squarely had the opportunity,"' nor
has it relied upon this understanding of Morgan in later cases."'
More fundamentally, the fact-finding rationale for Morgan was
faulty from the start. Whether a statute has a nexus with interstate
commerce is not, strictly speaking, a factual question."' To be

at 656. In response to Justice Harlan's dissent, which contended that the majority was in
effect allowing Congress to determine the meaning of the Constitution and to overturn
judicial interpretations, see id. at 666-68, Justice Brennan wrote the now-famous footnote
10 of the majority opinion. See id. at 651-52 n.10. In that footnote, Justice Brennan essentially stated that Congress could expand, but not contract, constitutional protections.
107. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
108. Id. at 177.
109. See also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that federal courts are
"supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution").
110. See Cox, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 104, at 104-07.
111. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Court considered the constitutionality of a federal statute lowering the voting age to eighteen for both state and federal
elections. As a matter of substantive constitutional law, it was unlikely that a majority of
the Justices would have struck down a higher voting age: this was the era of the "twotiered" approach to equal protection review, see infra notes 146-47 and accompanying
text, and age classifications would have received only a minimal rational-basis scrutiny.
(In relatively short order, of course, the Court did formally relegate age classifications to
this weak review. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976)). A simple way to uphold the statute would have been to embrace Cox's notion
that Congress has a superior capacity to find facts that constitute discrimination violating
equal protection norms. Precisely that theory was adopted-by only three Justices. See
Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 242-49, 278-81 (joint opinion of Brennan, white & Marshall, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Harlan, writing separately, objected that
the judgment about invidious discrimination was evaluative, not "factual." See id. at 20607 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The other Justices did not
squarely address this debate. That a majority of the Court in Mitchell struck down the
federal statute as applied to state elections does indicate, however, that the Cox rationale
was at least implicitly rejected.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 120-22.
113. For a good discussion of the overall problem, with reference to Commerce Clause

19961

THE FOOL ON THE HILL

sure, a factual assessment is essential for the proper resolution of
the issue. In the end, however, what is called for is a legal conclusion-a conclusion with the force of law, rather than a factual
conclusion-based on the application of a legal standard to the best
assessment of facts available. The process can be broken down into
its constituent parts: the articulation of a legal standard, and then
the application of that standard to the available facts.
The creation of the legal standard to implement a vague constitutional mandate-whether the nexus with commerce must be "direct" or may be "indirect," for example-is usually viewed as a

judicial, not a legislative, function. That is, after all, what the
dictum from Marbury is all about. Since Marbury, and certainly
since Cooper v. Aaron,"4 the judiciary has seen itself as the
branch of government charged with this task. To be sure, Cooper
may have been too arrogantly dismissive of the role of the other
branches, and there are good arguments that Congress and the
President have the responsibility to consider constitutionality, and
act on their views, at least so long as the primary judicial role is
respected." 5 In particular, as Olsen suggests, the political branches should have the authority to articulate factual premises and legal
conclusions different from the judiciary, and the judiciary should
consider them with respect. Nonetheless, for almost all public law
scholars, the courts have the final responsibility." 6
In the final analysis, merely calling a question one of fact, and
cases, see Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. the Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court
Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59
NOTRE DAmE L. REV. 337, 377-98 (1984).
114. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
115. My colleague Mike Paulsen's recent exposition, positing that on constitutional questions each federal branch has a "coordinate construction" power, is powerfully argued. See
Michael S. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What the Law
Is, 83 GEO. LJ. 217 (1994). My own views are closer to those of Paul Brest, who has
argued that conscientious legislators have a duty to engage in faithful constitutional interpretation, but ultimately must accord some deference to judicial resolutions of such questions. See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975). However one allocates interpretive power, it should
be viewed as just that, and not some other authority called "fact-finding."
116. Compare Paulsen, supra note 115, with Brest, supra note 115; see also Christopher
L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO.
LJ. 347 (1994); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice:
Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. LJ. 373
(1994); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for
Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1993); Geoffrey Miller, The President's Power of
Interpretation: Implications of a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, 56 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBS. 35 (1993).
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therefore for the legislature, or one of law, and therefore for courts,
substitutes result-oriented labeling for careful institutional analysis.
A realistic appraisal suggests that "characterizing a matter as one
of law or [of] fact is no more than a conclusion, based upon an
evaluation of pertinent policies, that one branch of government
rather than another should make the decision in question.""' In
this realm, prudence suggests there should be an intermediate
ground between judicial or congressional monopoly on constitutional interpretation, especially on questions of congressional power."8 In fact, the most important recent precedent considering
congressional power to enforce the Civil War Amendments may
provide a working model for such a middle ground.
In Rome v. United States,"9 the Court considered the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits covered jurisdictions from making any changes in electoral rules that have a
discriminatory effect upon protected classes, even if the change in
question is not motivated by discriminatory reasons. The Supreme
Court has held that the Fifteenth Amendment forbids only intentional racial discrimination in voting,"2 and thus there was a
strong argument that the Voting Rights Act exceeded Congress's
authority "to enforce" that amendment, as judicially interpreted. To
be sure, the simplest way to uphold the statute would have been to
invoke the Morgan power. That the Court did not, and indeed has
never done so since Morgan, is striking evidence that this power
has not withstood the test of time.
Yet the Court in Rome upheld the statute anyway. It adopted a
clever mediating tack. So long as Congress attempted to enforce
the correct, judicially articulated constitutional standard-that is,
that the Fifteenth Amendment was triggered only by intentional
discrimination--Congress had wide discretion in choosing the
Because the jurisdictions
means to achieve that enforcement.'
covered by the statute had a history of intentional discrimination in
voting, Congress was justified in being suspicious of electoral
changes with discriminatory effects. In light of this context, and

117. Pilchen, supra note 113, at 396-97.
118. For a thoughtful discussion of defining constitutional meaning through an ongoing
Court-Congress dialogue, see Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 577 (1993).
119. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
120. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61-62 (1980) (plurality opinion).
121. See Rome, 446 U.S. at 175-78.
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considering how hard it is to prove discriminatory intent, a prohibition on electoral changes with discriminatory effects was deemed a
reasonable, albeit overinclusive, way to prevent changes motivated
by discriminatory intent.
Note that under Rome, the judiciary establishes what the law
is-what the constitutional standard shall be-and then accords
Congress substantial, but not complete, discretion in applying that
standard to the facts of the real world, including the power to
adopt overbroad prophylactic rules to protect against the violation
of the standard. Unlike Morgan and Cox's fact-finding spin on it,
this model does not allow Congress, in effect, to change the meaning of the Constitution as interpreted by the Court.122 Instead, so
long as Congress acts reasonably to comply with judicially created
constitutional standards, the Court will accord Congress the discretion to carry out its responsibilities.
At first blush, the Rome model is similar to Perez, where Congress also articulated the judicial standard and made formal findings of its satisfaction-that is, intrastate loan sharking was linked
to interstate organized crime. The only problem is that in Perez the
congressional showing of facts supporting this premise was
thin-much thinner, in fact, than the facts upon which Rome upheld the Voting Rights Act.
Reconciling Rome and Perez might turn on the distinction
between the sources of congressional power in these cases. Congressional power to legislate pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment
is available only "to enforce" the substantive provisions of that
amendment. Section 1, the substantive provision, is triggered only
by an intentional deprivation of voting rights for racial reasons.
This is a narrow and hard-to-prove standard, probably explained
mostly by the desires to avoid labeling state and local governments
racist except on clear evidence and to avoid asking judges essen-

122. In my judgment, the best way to defend the Morgan power on the facts of that
case is not based on superior congressional capacity to find facts, but instead on the
notion that, under the proper interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress
should have legislative authority equivalent to a national police power concerning civil
rights. See generally William Cohen, Congressional Power To Interpret Due Process and
Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603 (1975). This would result from a judicial, rather
than congressional, authoritative interpretation of these Amendments. In any event, my
concern here is the equation of the Morgan power with Cox's fact-finding theory, not
with other efforts to defend that power, which may prove more persuasive. See, e.g.,
Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 145, 153-65

(1995).
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tially to take on a legislative function by balancing the harms
resulting from discriminatory effects against whatever justifications
there might be for the governmental decisions causing those effects." That the trigger for congressional power to interpret the
Civil War Amendments is interpreted grudgingly by judges may
explain why the factual support for a nexus with that trigger in
Rome should be stronger than would be necessary in a commerce
case.
This line of analysis leads to two intriguing observations. First,
of course, the trigger for congressional power to enforce the Commerce Clause was judicially interpreted grudgingly until Jones &
Laughlin. Both the requirement of a nexus with interstate commerce and a nexus with violations of the Civil War Amendments
are imposed in large part for federalism reasons, to avoid allowing
congressional power to swallow up the local police power. That
was as plain in the Civil Rights Cases,'24 the case requiring the
nexus for the Civil War Amendments, as it was in the pre-Jones &
Laughlin line of cases as well, perhaps most prominently discussed
in Hammer v. Dagenhart'" and Carter Coal. If, from the legal
realist point of view, the "felt needs" associated with the Great
Depression and the Democratic New Deal led to Jones & Laughlin
and its progeny, why has a similar loosening of congressional
power not occurred for enforcing the Civil War Amendments?
Morgan was a potentially liberating opinion, but it now seems
to have died on the vine. Had it been written more directly to
overrule the Civil Rights Cases and to hold that the Congress has a
national police power concerning civil rights, Morgan would have
been the civil-rights equivalent to the liberating Commerce Clause
opinions in Darby, Filburn, Heart of Atlanta, and McClung. For
today it seems clear, even after Lopez, that, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congress has what amounts to a national police
power to engage in economic regulation, even where the ultimate
goal of the regulation is social (as in Heart of Atlanta and

123. These are some of the concerns that apparently animated the Court in Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), to require a showing of intentional discrimination to invalidate facially neutral classifications under the Equal Protection Clause. Four years later, in
Mobile v. Bolden, the Court extended the Davis approach to the Fifteenth Amendment.
See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 61-65.
124. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
125. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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McClung) rather than economic. 26
One explanation might be that there has never been a crisis in
recent times in which the Court has invalidated important civil
rights legislation, thereby setting up a strong societal reaction and
retaliation from the political branches. Indeed, in one of the great
ironies of constitutional law, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlaws
racial discrimination in public accommodations' 27 -the same activity outlawed by the Civil Rights Act of 1875,"2 which was
struck down in the Civil Rights Cases. The difference is that the
1964 Act is constitutionally justified by the commerce power, as
interpreted in Heart of Atlanta and McClung. The incredible expansion of the commerce power has largely prevented any civil rights
equivalents to Carter Coal, Hammer (which invalidated child-labor
legislation), and so on. Where the commerce power has not been
invoked-for example, with respect to the Voting Rights Act-the
Court has still upheld the statute as consistent with Congress's
authority under the Civil War Amendments.'29
The other essential difference may be in the specificity of the
underlying matter to which a nexus must be shown. "Affecting
interstate commerce" is, of course, a question of degree, and there
seems to be no reason to try to draw a sharp line around it, especially where, in the first instance, the judgment must be made by a
co-equal branch, Congress. A violation of the Civil War Amendments, on the other hand, will most commonly be defined in caseby-case litigation in which individuals sue states and local governments, rather than in congressional hearings or the like. For the
benefit of both parties, certainty and predictability are required, so
individuals know their rights and states and local governments
know their responsibilities and where constitutional liability, with
all its economic and stigmatic consequences, begins.
Of course, Lopez might result in a reordering of congressional

126. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69, 99-100.
127. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title II, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
128. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
129. Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented in Rome, and more recently the
Court has expressed qualms about the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, if it is
understood to compel states to take race into account in redistricting their legislatures. See
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); cf.
Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2591-619 (1994) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (urging colorblindness in interpreting the Voting Rights Act). At
this writing, however, no judicial frontal attack has been made on congressional power to
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments.
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power, in which the commerce power and the power to enforce the
Civil War Amendments become more congruent. At a minimum,
after Lopez, a prudent Congress might wish to follow the Rome
model when exercising its commerce power: articulate the judicial
standard (the subject of the statute must have a substantial effect
upon interstate commerce) and then document the satisfaction of
that standard through facts developed in hearings and other legislative methods. Any such reordering is unlikely to depend upon the
presence of formal congressional findings-which, after all, may be
trumped-up or mere boilerplate-nearly as much as upon the development of a sound factual basis for congressional power. A heightened concern about congressional processes and their outcomes
along these lines-what might be labeled "due process of lawmaking"13 ---could take many different tacks. Two such routes seem
to me to be especially interesting to examine.
The first, suggested by the Fifth Circuit in Lopez, would focus
upon what Bill Eskridge and I have called "quasi-constitutional
law"IM-the use of techniques to nullify the force of congressional action without outright declaring it unconstitutional. In a rather
inscrutable discussion, the Fifth Circuit attempted to draw support
for its invalidation of the gun statute by noting that the law invaded not just the local police power in general, but local control of a
core state function, education, in particular. The appeals court then
cited several Supreme Court cases buffering federal intrusions upon
state authority.3 3 As the appeals court itself recognized, however,
"the rule being applied in those cases is one of statutory construction, 133 and thus has no obvious application in a case in which
the constitutionality of a federal statute is at issue. Moreover, following the overruling of National League of Cities v. Usery 34 in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,'35 the Constitution does not forbid congressional exercises of the commerce
power that invade core state functions.

130. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 199 (1976)
(coining the phrase, which I am using in a broader sense than he did, for Linde did not
approve of intrusive "rational basis" inquiries).
131. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 640 (1992) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw].
132. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364-66.
133. Id. at 1365.
134. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
135. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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The Supreme Court in Lopez also obliquely referred to these
statutory cases,1 6 which supports both the instinct that they are
somehow relevant and the conclusion that it is difficult to express
precisely why that might be so. In my judgment, these cases are
relevant and represent an opportunity for the Court to provide
some flexible, process-based judicial review in place of wooden
judicial invalidation of congressional initiatives.
In jettisoning almost all Tenth Amendment limitations on the
commerce power, even when it invades core state functions, Garcia
intimated that the primary protection of federalism is through the
congressional process. 7 This abandonment of substantive constitutional law-Marbury-style invalidation-would not logically require the judicial avoidance of all inquiries into the processes and
outcomes of the legislative arena. Indeed, in short order, the Court
in Gregory v. Ashcroft3 transformed the old Usery substantive
inquiry into an interpretive one: a federal statute enacted pursuant
to the commerce power would be construed as invading core state
functions only if its text compelled that interpretation.'39 Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Gregory stated that, "inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political
process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of
Congress's Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise."'" To implement
this "super-strong clear statement requirement,''. the Court in
Gregory apparently borrowed its approach to interpreting federal
statutes arguably abrogating the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit: the statute does not invade state prerogatives unless
Congress has "ma[de] its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute. ' 42In essence, the serious federalism
problems would be addressed through judge-created techniques of

136. See 115 S. Ct. at 1631 & n.3; see also id. at 1640-42 (Kennedy, J., joined by
O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that careful review of gun statute is called for because
it intrudes on core state functions).
137. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 ("[Ihe principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our
system provides through state participation in federal governmental action. The political
process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.").
138. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
139. Id. at 464-65.
140. Id. at 464.
141. See Eslaidge & Frickey, supra note 131, at 597, 623-25.
142. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
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statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretation.
To be sure, the flight from constitutional invalidation to quasiconstitutional interpretive methods that I have traced is not directly
applicable to the Lopez problem. The statute in question plainly
outlawed the possession of guns near schools, and thereby unmistakably invaded the core state functions of implementing the local
police power in general and of providing public education in particular. At a more abstract level, however, Garcia and Gregory
combine to suggest not only that what language Congress chooses,
but how Congress came to embrace that language, is a matter of
judicial concern. The clear-statement requirement adopted in Gregory is a forthright judicial effort to influence congressional processes. Most obviously, the approach attempts to force Congress to
draft statutes clearly. More subtly, it essentially seeks not just to
force the objection based on the invasion of state sovereignty onto
the congressional agenda, but also to highlight it. The assumption
must be that the Gregory canon of interpretation will lead to more
thorough and thoughtful congressional deliberations concerning
whether invasions of state sovereignty are justified, and is not
simply a way to prevent wholly inadvertent intrusions on state
authority. Indeed, in Gregory, the Court forthrightly stated that the
clear-statement requirement was designed to assure "that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved."' 43 On this understanding, the Gregory canon is a judicial means of implementing Garcia's shift from substance to process in the protection of state sovereignty.
If, as I have argued, Gregory is an approach for implementing
Garcia's procedural focus, rather than some interpretive end in
itself, other judicially constructed means may be forthcoming as
well. One obvious candidate is a requirement of formal congressional findings in certain situations. Because findings could simply be
boilerplate drafting with little impact upon the Garcia-promoted
internal congressional dialogue about federal legislation and state
sovereignty, however, a broader focus upon congressional process
might seem more fruitful. Yet, in the ordinary case, of course, the
legislative process is irrelevant to the constitutionality of the congressional product.'" There are a few cases, however, that essen143. Id. at 461 (citing Bass, 404 U.S. at 349).
144. At the state level, the best counterexample is probably the enforcement of the
common state constitutional requirement that every law have only one subject, expressed
in its title. See, e.g., Department of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1982); Millard
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tially embrace the view that the quality of legislative procedures

makes a difference in assessing constitutionality. It is to this final
subject that I now turn.145
For at least two decades, federal constitutional law has been
embroiled in a controversy about "tiers of scrutiny."'" Before the
1970s, two tiers existed: strict scrutiny (which was strict in theory,
but fatal in fact) 47 and the rational basis test, which allowed essentially any statute to pass constitutional muster. Much sprawl and
muddle has arisen since that time. Strict scrutiny has not always
been fatal."~ The Court sometimes could not agree'49 or refused
to make clear' what scrutiny it was applying, and the rational
basis test occasionally leapt up and struck down a statute.' The
most interesting development, though, has been the creation of a

M. Ruud, "No Law Shall Embrace More than One Subject," 42 MINN. L. REV. 389
(1958). The single-subject rule might seem mere formalism, but it could well have the
useful effects of forcing the legislature to place unrelated issues in separate bills, rather
than combine them for logrolling purposes.
145. For a thoughtful scholarly presentation of the position that attention to the legislative process should influence the constitutional calculus, see Terrance Sandalow, Judicial
Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1162 (1977). See also DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRmCAL INTRODUCTION 122-25, 12930, 136-38 (1991). For one Justice's embrace of this perspective, see Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 549-52 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the argument that
judicial review should focus on "due process" of legislative processes but not be concerned with substantive review of the rationality of the legislative product, see Linde,
supra note 130.
146. For an important article identifying this emerging phenomenon, see Gerald Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
147. Id. at 8.
148. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.) (purporting to apply strict scrutiny but suggesting that the admissions program
at Harvard, which took race into account as a non-conclusive factor, would be constitutional). In the most recent affirmative-action precedent, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995), Justice O'Connor's majority opinion took great pains to
suggest that strict scrutiny does not inevitably lead to constitutional invalidation.
149. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.)(proposing strict scrutiny for gender classifications); id. at 691 (Powell, J.,
joined by Burger, CJ., and Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (deferring the question of the level of scrutiny applicable to gender classifications).
150. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491-92 (1980) (declining to specify
the level of scrutiny being applied).
151. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 346
(1989) (striking down a tax assessment scheme); Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432 (1985) (discussed infra notes 169-80 and accompanying text); Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (striking down Alaska's dividend distribution plan); United States
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 528 (1973) (striking down a provision of the
Food Stamp Act of 1964).
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third, intermediate tier. The most prominent cases subjected to
intermediate scrutiny have been those involving gender classifications.' When a statute is assessed under mid-level scrutiny, its
sensitive classification, such as one based on gender, can be sustained only if it "serve[s] important governmental objectives and
[is] substantially related to achievement of those objectives."'' 3
This standard contemplates a judicial inquiry into the legislative
process, for it seeks to evaluate the actual governmental objective
that motivated the legislature. More than that, however, the invocation of heightened scrutiny in effect bursts the presumption of
constitutionality and shifts the burden of winning the argument on
constitutionality to the government and away from the person challenging the sensitive classification.'54 Thus, this heightened scrutiny essentially forces legislatures to "choose either to realign their
substantive laws in a gender-neutral fashion, or to adopt procedures for identifying those instances where the sex-centered generalization actually comported with fact."'55
It seems clear that, in at least two cases, congressional procedures and fact-gathering have influenced the constitutional outcome.
In upholding the exclusion of women from the selective service in
Rostker v. Goldberg,'56 the Court stressed that the Congress had
recently "carefully considered and debated" the alternatives. 7
Rostker is to equal-protection review what Perez is to CommerceClause review. In contrast, at least once the Court took into account the absence of congressional consideration. In Califano v.

152. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), is, of course, the foundational opinion. The
Court has also applied intermediate scrutiny to classifications that disadvantage persons
born outside of marriage. See, e.g., Craig v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
153. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
154. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
Our decisions establish that the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies
individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification. The burden is met
only by showing at least that the classification serves "important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed" are "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."
Id. at 724 (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)). On the relation of
the presumption of constitutionality, tiers of scrutiny, and facts in constitutional cases, see
Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of Reality by the Supreme Court,
35 U. FLA. L. REv. 236, 245-52 (1983).
155. Craig, 429 U.S. at 199 (emphasis added).
156. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
157. Id. at 70.
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Goldfarb,5 ' the Social Security provision in question provided
that survivor's benefits, based on the earnings of a deceased husband, were automatically payable to his widow, but that a surviving widower would get such benefits only if his deceased wife had
provided at least half of his support. The Court had earlier upheld
a gender classification that, the Court thought, appropriately recognized that widows are more economically disadvantaged than widowers. 59 The Court had also upheld a gender classification designed to compensate women naval officers for the increased difficulties they faced in building a record justifying promotion in rank
caused by their exclusion from combat and many forms of sea
duty."6 In Goldfarb, the Court refused to apply the compensatory
rationale of these cases because there was no indication that the
gender classification at issue was based on "a reasoned congressional judgment that nondependent widows should receive benefits
because they are more likely to be needy than nondependent widowers.'' By stressing the absence of appropriate congressional
support as a factor negating constitutionality, Goldfarb is the equalprotection analogue to Lopez.
All that these analogies do, however, is leave us with a greater-indeed, the ultimate-puzzle that follows from Lopez. The
heightened inquiry into congressional process found in the gender
cases resulted from the heightened constitutional scrutiny applied to
gender classifications. Yet Lopez did not purport to apply heightened scrutiny to the gun statute at issue in that case. It acknowledged that under the relevant precedent, the only question was
whether "a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated
activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce."'6 As Justice
Souter stressed in his dissent, 3 the degree of scrutiny applied by
the majority seems much more rigorous than the rational-basis
inquiry routinely applied by the Court.'" Moreover, as Justice
Breyer stated in his dissent, the absence of formal congressional

158. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
159. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1974).
160. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
161. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 214.
162. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (emphasis added) (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Perez, Katzenbach v. McClung, and Heart of Atlanta Motel).
163. See id. at 1651-57 (Souter, J., dissenting).
164. For a recent and extremely deferential statement of garden-variety rational-basis
review, see FCC v. Beech Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101-03 (1993).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 46:695

findings "at most, deprives a statute of the benefit of some extra
leeway."165 Justice Souter (correctly) read the majority opinion as
turning on "commercial character,"'" but wondered if "[flurther
glosses on rationality review . . may be in the offing," such as
whether "the congressional statute deal[s] with subjects of traditional state regulation" or "contain[s] explicit factual findings supporting the otherwise implicit determination that the regulated activity
substantially affects interstate commerce."' 67 Just what does Lopez
mean for rational-basis review?
There is at least one relatively recent equal-protection decision
that purports to turn on rational-basis review that is somewhat
analogous to Lopez and that might shed light for the future.' 6 In
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,69 decided a little more than
a decade ago, the Court considered an equal-protection challenge to
a municipality's exclusion of a group home for the developmentally
disabled. The majority opinion of Justice White firmly rejected
applying intermediate scrutiny, essentially fearing it would produce
a slippery slope for other cases brought by permanently disabled
persons. 7 Then, applying what it called rational-basis review, the
Court invalidated the city's zoning decision anyway. 7 '
The rationality standard the Court in Cleburne invoked had at
least four innovative features. Two of them are captured in the
Court's statement that "legislation that distinguishes between the
mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose."'7 First, the Court did not quote a
generic version of rational-basis review, found in the great run of
cases, that essentially says that all legislation, regardless of its
subject matter, subject to this minimal level of scrutiny must be

165. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1658 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
166. See id. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting). On the importance of the noneconomic
character of the regulation, see supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
167. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
168. For citation of earlier cases, see supra note 151.
169. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
170. See id. at 445. In a nutshell, Justice white stated that the developmentally disabled
are differently situated from others; legislatures have shown sympathy to their plight,
negating the inference that they are politically powerless; and according heightened scrutiny to these classifications would create a "slippery slope" problem in assessing the demands of other groups for the protections of heightened scrutiny.
171. See id. at 448.
172. Id. at 446 (emphases added).
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upheld if any rational basis for it can be ascertained. 73 Instead,
the Court focused on the precise problem before it: a classification
dealing with the developmentally disabled. This concretized the
inquiry and emphasized that noneconomic human deprivation, not
mere economic regulation, was involved. Second, the requirement
of a relation to a legitimate governmental purpose was novel. Usually, any governmental purpose that is not independently unconstitutional-that is, does not run afoul of some constitutional provision other than equal protection-will suffice. 74 To the extent
that legitimacy is a normative concern broader than independent
unconstitutionality, that breathes substantive life into the Equal
Protection Clause itself and makes this form of rational-basis review more stringent than the garden-variety form. Indeed, a passage soon thereafter in the opinion confimns this conclusion and
constitutes the third innovation. The Court wrote that "some objectives-such as a 'bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular
group'-are not legitimate state interests."' 75 In this manner, the
Court essentially held that, at least outside the field of economic
regulation, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government
from bashing people because of antipathy. Finally, in applying this
second-order rationality review, the Court seemed to conclude that
plaintiffs had made a prima facie case of unconstitutionality and
then shifted the burden of proof on constitutionality to the city,
which failed to present a nondiscriminaory factual basis for its decision. 76

173. See, e.g., Beech Communications, 113 S. Ct. at 2101-03.
174. Although this understanding of the most minimal level of scrutiny is not ordinarily
stated as such, it is implicit in most of the cases involving economic regulation. See, e.g.,
id. at 2101 ("In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification"). In noneconomic cases before
Cleburne, however, the Court had occasionally indicated that the end served by the governmental action must be legitimate. See D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes
and State Enforcement of Morality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 67, 83-86.
175. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47 (quoting United States v. Dept. of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 531 (1973)).
176. The Court twice stressed that "the record" did not reveal how the developmentally
disabled were different in any nonarbilrary or nondiscriminatory way from others. Id. at
448, 450. The Court finally stated that "'[tihe City never justifie[d]"' its decision. Id. at
450. These comments contrast sharply to garden-variety rational-basis techniques. Ordinarily, of course, the challenger bears an insurmountable burden of proof, for she must carry
the "burden 'to negative every conceivable basis which might support"' the law. Beech
Communications, 113 S. Ct. at 2102 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 410
U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). Moreover, because when applying minimal scrutiny the Court
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Remarkably, although they may seem light-years apart doctrinally, Cleburne shares several important features with Lopez. The
rationality review used in both of them is far more stringent than
the usual, "anything goes" variety. The apparent reason why the
Court used a second-order rationality inquiry is that the regulation
was noneconomic in nature and touched upon important personal
(Cleburne) or structural (Lopez) values. Probably a critical factor in
both decisions is that both of these values are difficult to enforce
through judicial review. The message of both cases, I believe, is
that the lesson of the New Deal is that economic regulation is not
a matter for serious judicial second-guessing, but that other measures seriously invading personal or structural values can be subjected to meaningful judicial review. Because of significant linedrawing problems of the "slippery slope" variety in formally applying intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on developmental
disability and to federal statutes invading state sovereignty, however, this review will understandably be on a case-by-case basis. That
kind of second-order rationality review may result in shifting the
burden of defending the statute in question to the government,
which will often be a fact-based inquiry. Accordingly, explicit
legislative findings based on a well-developed legislative history
would be very helpful to the government in defending the statute.
The irony is that the Rehnquist Court has created Lopez two
years after it may have terminated Cleburne. In Heller v. Doe,'"
a sharply divided Court applied routine rational-basis review, rather
than the second-order kind applied in Cleburne, to a classification
disadvantaging the developmentally disabled as compared to the
mentally ill. In my view, Justice Souter, in dissent, invoked the
true understanding of Cleburne by requiring a second-order level of
scrutiny "to a classification on the basis of mental disability"''
and then applying that degree of review in a diligent manner consistent with Cleburne.
When all is said and done, the heightened concern about con-

never require[s] a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is
entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for
the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature . . . . Thus, the absence of "legislative facts" explaining the distinction "[o]n the record" . . . has
no significance in rational-basis analysis.
Id.
177. 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
178. Id. at 2651.
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gressional fact-development and fact-finding suggested by Lopez
could be a plausible technique for curbing legislative excess in
noneconomic cases in general. 179 If so, Cleburne, too, ought not
only survive, but flourish. Both cases, if carefully applied and
thoughtfully limited, could promote a meaningful dialogue between
judiciary and legislature concerning just where the difficult-to-draw
lines should exist concerning important constitutional values of
personal equality and federalism."8 In contrast, if we are ultimately left with Lopez alone, I fear that the Rehnquist Court has
again subjected itself to the criticism that the values it promotes
are
formalist
rather
than
humanitarian,
selectively
countermajoritarian, and "reflect an overall constitutional vision that
is strikingly old-fashioned.''.
1II.
Did the Court in Lopez "ignor[e] the painful lesson learned in
1937," as Justice Souter suggested in dissent?" An affirmative
answer to that question is plausible, but not inevitable. Justice
Souter is not likely to bolster his arguments by reference to popular culture, but as I have already fallen victim to that technique in
the introduction to this essay, perhaps it is a fitting way to end it
as well. Lennonism (and McCartneyism) might provide not simply
a time frame for considering developments in federalism,' but
some worthy language as well.8 4
Lopez comes close to treating Congress as the fool on the
Hill-a metaphor of real salience to vociferous supporters of federalism. But constitutional law should be a long and winding road of
many lanes, only one of which is federalism. Treating the concerns
animating Lopez as constitutionally cognizable should mean that
they are generalizable to analogous situations, such as some equal
protection cases. That, too, is a path fraught with difficulties, but it

179. For one model of how second-order rationality review might work, see Gunther,
supra note 146. For a more recent exposition, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 69 (1985), discussing "strengthened rationality review."
180. On the importance of such a dialogue in contributing to a public law that is stable
but not static, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court,
1993 Term-Foreword: Law As Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 87 (1994).
181. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 131, at 640.
182. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
184. Cf. Jim Chen, Rock 'n' Roll Law School, 12 CoNsT. COMM. 315 (1995).
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at least would make Lopez more like law and less like power. That
Hill is, after all, home to the Court as well, and roomy enough for
more than one fool.

